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Revealing and Thereby Tempering the 
Abuses of Government-Created 
Evidence in Criminal Trials 
Robert P. Mosteller† 
INTRODUCTION 
I am delighted to add my contribution to this 
symposium in honor of the academic achievements of Professor 
Margaret Berger. I do this through three points. The first is 
Professor Berger’s commitment to providing the jury with 
information to do its job more effectively and her faith in that 
institution when properly armed with adequate information. 
The second is her particular remedy of requiring the 
recordation of evidence created by the government, and 
revealing that record to the jury as a way of tempering the 
corrupting influence of the government’s hand in the evidence 
development process. I heartily endorse these positions and 
find them to have widespread and enduring applicability. 
Finally, I comment on an admirable characteristic that I have 
found constant throughout Professor Berger’s work that adds 
to its brilliance: her reasoned judgment.  
I anchor my comments in arguments Professor Berger 
made regarding the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution at a time when 
Ohio v. Roberts1 provided the controlling paradigm, before it 
was replaced by Crawford v. Washington.2 I do not wish to 
suggest that Professor Berger was a defender of the 
trustworthiness/reliability system of Roberts, for she was not.3 
  
 † J. Dickson Phillips Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North 
Carolina School of Law. I want to thank Professors Ed Cheng and Jeff Powell for their 
comments on an earlier draft of this essay. 
 1 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 2 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 3 See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation 
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 605-13 
(1992) (recognizing the “illusory protection afforded to a defendant by the evidentiary 
version of confrontation” and arguing to give greater protection against admission of 
 
1278 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4 
She did, however, attempt to make that system more protective 
of the central principles she believed the Sixth Amendment 
embodied.  
Some of her ideas may fit within the Crawford 
framework as its detail is fleshed out in the future by the 
Supreme Court and lower courts. Some of these ideas may not, 
but these sound arguments are still worth noting since they 
may be embodied in legislation or in a new generation of 
procedural protections.  
I. AN INSIGHTFUL AND INFLUENTIAL BRIEF IN IDAHO V. 
WRIGHT: PROTECTING THE DEFENDANT’S 
CONFRONTATION RIGHT BY PROVIDING THE JURY WITH 
THE BASIS TO ASSESS THE DECLARANT’S STATEMENT 
My first specific example of a contribution by Professor 
Berger is the amicus brief she authored for the American Civil 
Liberties Union in Idaho v. Wright.4 In accord with her basic 
position, the Supreme Court concluded that the state had failed 
to demonstrate the requisite showing of reliability for a 
hearsay statement admitted under the catchall exception and 
reversed the conviction.5 As I stated in an earlier article, 
“Precisely why the Court decided to find the hearsay in Wright 
inadmissible because not supported by particularized indicia of 
reliability cannot be clearly established. However, the decision 
may have flowed from the arguments made by Professor 
Margaret Berger in an amicus brief.”6  
Indeed, one finds many echoes of Professor Berger’s 
arguments in the facts described in Justice O’Connor’s opinion 
in Wright that apparently led to the outcome in the case. 
Unfortunately as discussed in later parts of this essay, one does 
not find in the Court’s opinion all of her proposed solutions.7  
  
statements produced by government authorities). This article is discussed further at 
infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 4 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
 5 Id. at 827. 
 6 Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to 
Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them”, 82 IND. L.J. 917, 934 n.53 (2007) 
(citing Amicus Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (No. 89-260)). 
 7 Professor Berger noted that “[i]ndicia of reliability are ‘easy to come by,’ 
[and that] . . . one part of the majority opinion in Idaho v. Wright reads like a handbook 
instructing prosecutors how to offer a child’s hearsay statement with requisite 
‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’” See Berger, supra note 3, at 606. 
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Wright involved testimony of Dr. John Jambura that 
contained the “statements” of a two-and-one-half-year-old child, 
Kathy Wright. These statements led to the conviction of 
Kathy’s mother for “lewd conduct with a minor” for allegedly 
assisting a male companion in raping both Kathy and her five 
and one-half year old sister.8 Kathy’s statements were admitted 
through Dr. Jambura, and she did not testify because the trial 
court found that she was “‘not capable of communicating to the 
jury.’”9  
Professor Berger emphasized the importance of the 
confrontation right to the jury being able to perform its role: 
“The statements made by Kathy to Dr. Jambura lie at the 
heart of this case. Yet, for a number of reasons, the jury could 
not assess their reliability with any degree of confidence.”10 
Chief among these reasons was that “it is not even clear from 
the doctor’s testimony precisely what words Kathy used.”11 The 
statement “is not being reported in its entirety, contains too 
few details to confirm its consistency with the supposed event, 
and was elicited in response to leading questions designed to 
confirm the questioner’s hypothesis.”12 She noted the lack of 
“any verbatim record of the interview,”13 which she would argue 
in a later article should be turned into a potential requirement 
and remedy. 
Professor Berger argued that the key role of the 
Confrontation Clause is to enable the jury to do its job of 
deciding guilt and innocence in the difficult cases where the 
jurors’ albeit imperfect human instincts and judgments are all 
that stand between a just and an unjust verdict. With a child 
as young as Kathy, she emphasized that the jury needed to see 
the child testify (or at least have her exact words) so it could 
assess whether Kathy had reached the developmental stage 
where she “underst[ood] the need to tell the truth, or could 
distinguish fact from fantasy.”14 Additionally, the jury could not 
evaluate Kathy’s capacity for communicative speech.15 Professor 
  
 8 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 808-12. 
 9 Id. at 809. 
 10 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 9, Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (No. 89-260) [hereinafter Amicus 
Brief in Wright]. 
 11 Id. at 10. 
 12 Id. at 16-17. 
 13 Id. at 4. 
 14 Id. at 9. 
 15 Id. at 9-10. 
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Berger recognized that “[f]actors such as the speed and flow of 
a witness’ speech, as well as articulation, intonation, 
mannerisms of speech and use of nonverbal modes of 
communication, on direct and on cross examination, enter into 
a jury’s assessment.”16 As she acknowledged, cross-examination 
of young children is a difficult enterprise, potentially made 
even more difficult by the psychological process of 
confabulation whereby details from imagination and earlier 
responses merge with the actual memory of the event to make 
the child erroneously believe a flawed version of the events.17 
But it should still be provided. She summarized a number of 
concerns as follows: 
The jury cannot evaluate accurately whether [Kathy’s] statement 
recounts a past event, or is the consequence of suggestive 
questioning in alien surroundings, in the presence of strangers, after 
undergoing what must have been an extremely unpleasant physical 
examination. In the absence of Kathy, the jury did not have the 
information needed to assess the appropriate weight to be given 
Kathy’s statement.18 
Professor Berger noted the special difficulty posed when 
the alleged statement of the child is presented through an 
expert, which gives her purported testimony through an 
impressive medium but without adequate testing. “Interposing 
the expert between the declarant and the jury deprives the jury 
of its right to make determinations of credibility.”19 Having Dr. 
Jambura on the stand was not, she argued, an adequate 
substitute. “Cross-examining the expert is not the equivalent of 
cross-examining the declarant upon whose statements the 
expert is relying in expressing his opinion. To the contrary, the 
defendant may be deprived of his rights to confrontation if he 
has no access to the declarant upon whom the expert is 
relying.”20 
The difficulty she notes here for statements introduced 
through experts reverberates into the new system created by 
Crawford. A clear challenge yet to be addressed by the 
Supreme Court under the “testimonial statement” approach is 
whether its determination that statements not “offered for the 
  
 16 Id. at 10. 
 17 Id. at 11. 
 18 Id. at 17. 
 19 Id. at 18. 
 20 Id. 
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truth” are outside Confrontation Clause protection21 applies to 
statements admitted for the limited purpose of supporting the 
expert’s opinion. Although the answer under the hearsay rules 
is that such statements are not offered for the truth, the 
answer should be different under Confrontation Clause 
analysis for the straightforward reason that Professor Berger 
offers. Unfortunately, that difference appears to be eluding 
many lower courts presently as they use the wooden analysis of 
following the hearsay definition22 and not the importance of 
confrontation to enable the jury to evaluate the accuracy of the 
second-hand account. 
Professor Berger’s arguments are simple, powerful, and 
correct. As part of an overall pattern of rights within the Sixth 
Amendment, a major role of the Confrontation Clause is to 
empower jurors to do their task properly and accurately. The 
goal is the testing of the witness’ version of events in front of 
the lay factfinders, part of our inherited overall system of live 
witnesses presenting their evidence at a public trial. Her 
specific vision, which I believe is sound, is not of a 
Confrontation Clause that provides a “get out of jail free” right 
but rather a guarantee that seeks to maximize the actual 
“confrontation” of the jury with the grist from which its 
members can reach their own judgments. That involves both 
the declarant’s direct testimony and the testing through cross-
examination by counsel for the accused in front of those jurors.23 
In support of the Idaho Supreme Court,24 Professor 
Berger argued that the Court should require the recording of 
children’s statements when elicited by prosecutorial authorities 
in adversarial situations.25 Although her proposal was out of 
sync with both the Wright Court and today’s Court, the 
suggestion of using “prophylactic rules as the instrumental 
  
 21 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (citing Tennessee 
v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985) in which a clearly testimonial statement and 
confession by a co-defendant that differed substantially from the defendant’s version of 
the events was used to refute the defendant’s claim that he was coerced into a 
confession that tracked the co-defendant’s statements). 
 22 See Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The 
Constitutional Boundaries of Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 846-48, 854-
57 (2008) (noting lower court rulings that such statements are exempted from 
confrontation scrutiny and the fallacy of the reasoning). 
 23 See Amicus Brief in Wright, supra note 10, at 7. 
 24 See State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1230 (1989) (concluding that because 
there was no audio or videotape of the interview, the dangers of unreliability could 
“never be fully assessed”). 
 25 See Amicus Brief in Wright, supra note 10, at 20-27. 
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means to further constitutional objectives”26 stands in excellent 
company with Sixth Amendment precedent and with good 
judgment that is being utilized today in many sectors as we 
recognize the need to protect the innocent.27  
Finally, she argued that corroboration of the statement’s 
truth by external evidence could not be a basis for declaring the 
statement trustworthy and in turn could not justify its receipt 
under the Roberts’ trustworthiness/reliability system.28 The 
Court reached this same conclusion largely applying hearsay 
theory.29 Professor Berger argued for it on a different and more 
enduring basis. It was part of her broader view that the 
purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to enable the jury to 
assess the declarant’s statement, which was part of a 
theoretical vision that became clear in the article to which I 
turn next. Her vision is that the Confrontation Clause has a 
particular role in protecting the accused from government 
developed evidence. In her brief, she articulated one 
ramification of that view:  
If confrontation is to be excused when corroborating evidence exists, 
the constitutional right . . . will become meaningless. Prosecutors 
would be encouraged to rely on weak witnesses whom they would be 
able to bolster by hearsay evidence that would not violate the 
Confrontation Clause because it was corroborated. Such 
bootstrapping would spell an end to the constitutional right 
embodied in the clause . . . .30 
II. FORMULATING THE FUNDAMENTAL ARGUMENT TO 
CONTROL MUCH GOVERNMENT-CREATED HEARSAY BY 
REQUIRING THE RECORDING OF THE PROCESS OF 
CREATION  
My second specific point of reference is Professor 
Berger’s article, The Deconstitutionalization of the 
Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint 
  
 26 Id. at 20. 
 27 See Matthew D. Thurlow, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras as Tools 
of Justice, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 771, 772-73 (2005) (recognizing a 
broad public campaign to record as a means of protecting the innocent and noting that 
three states through judicial decision and three others through legislative action have 
mandated recording interrogations). 
 28 See Amicus Brief in Wright, supra note 10, at 19-20. 
 29 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819-21 (1990). The Court did recognize 
the danger of “bootstrapping” weak evidence into the case, see id. at 823, but it did not 
give the prominence to this danger of prosecution created evidence that Professor 
Berger’s prosecutorial restraint model would justify.  
 30 Amicus Brief in Wright, supra note 10, at 20. 
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Model.31 In this article, she argues for special scrutiny for 
hearsay statements made by declarants to government agents. 
Although the Court did not cite her article as influencing its 
determination to adopt a new paradigm in Crawford, Justice 
Breyer did cite it as one of three academic articles suggesting a 
new approach in his statement of personal dissatisfaction with 
the Roberts approach prior to the Crawford decision.32 
Professor Berger’s position that special attention should 
be paid to statements elicited by government agents is largely 
consistent with the Court’s new testimonial statement 
approach. In Crawford, the Court stated that “[i]nvolvement of 
government officers in the production of testimony with an eye 
toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial 
abuse—a fact borne out time and again throughout a history 
with which the Framers were keenly familiar.”33 While her 
remedies do not fully appear to fit the new paradigm, my point 
is not directed towards the mismatch. It is instead about the 
correctness of the central insight and the importance of her 
basic approach and remedy. 
That approach is to give special scrutiny to the 
situations where government agents and the prosecution are 
involved during the formation of evidence and have the ability 
to affect its development and content. In those situations, her 
remedy is to require additional safeguards that would enable 
the jury to assess the reliability of the process and the impact 
of the government’s role in it.34 
If the declarant is produced by the prosecution as a 
witness at trial, ordinarily no special protection is required 
even though the government had a role in securing the 
statement. However, additional protections are needed if the 
declarant is particularly vulnerable. For vulnerable witnesses, 
such as mentally unstable witnesses, children, or someone like 
  
 31 Berger, supra note 3, at 605-13. 
 32 See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
  Justice Breyer cited Professor Berger’s article and two others, one by 
Professor Richard Friedman and a book by Akhil Amar. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1997); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: 
The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998). The majority in Crawford 
cited the other two but omitted Professor Berger’s article. Perhaps the reason is that 
she was critical of what appears to be the majority’s narrow, formalistic approach and 
its argument to exempt all other hearsay rather than to give greater protection to 
statements secured by government agents. See Berger, supra note 3, at 563-64. 
 33 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004). 
 34 Berger, supra note 3 at 561-62. 
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the victim in United States v. Owens35 who was suffering from a 
head injury, the prosecution would be required to produce 
either a tape of the interview or transcript of the hearing where 
the statement was produced.36 For coconspirator statements, 
she draws a distinction between those made to true 
conspirators who are private citizens involved in crime and 
acting independent of the government, and those made to 
undercover agents and recognized informants. Because of the 
paramount concern of government-shaped statements, she 
would require exclusion of statements made to government 
agents and informants who, at the time of the statements, were 
already cooperating with the government, unless either the 
declarant was produced as a witness at trial or the 
conversation with the government agent or informant was 
recorded.37 She argues the same approach—the required 
recording of statements—should be used with children when 
the person conducting the interview is doing so at the behest of 
the police.38 
Under the testimonial statement approach, significant 
protection will be provided in a number of the situations 
  
 35 484 U.S. 55 (1988) (involving brain damaged victim of an assault who 
identified the defendant as the perpetrator during a pre-trial identification procedure). 
 36 See Berger, supra note 3, at 607-08 & n.207. 
 37 See id. at 608-09. 
 38 See id. at 611-12. 
  I have been of two minds regarding Professor Berger’s approach to 
videotaping children’s statements. On the one hand, I took issue with what I 
understood to be her approach of permitting the statements to be introduced without 
confrontation, even if accusatory, as long as the interview was videotaped. See Robert 
P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the 
Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 752 n.293 
(1993) (noting substantial agreement with Professor Berger’s approach but disagreeing 
that documenting the conversation would provide an adequate alternative). On the 
other, I recognized that there are very good reasons for videotaping early statements by 
children and that it would be unfortunate if Crawford caused the practice to be 
discontinued. See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and 
Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 539-40 n.144 (2005) 
(noting specifically the reduction of trauma from multiple interviews). 
  In the end, I am a firm believer in realistic solutions, and the 
documentation of the interview through mechanical recording is a very sound second-
best solution that would provide the jury with a far better look into the circumstances 
and accuracy of the incriminating statements than does recital of its contents from the 
perspective of the government agent who obtained the statement. My preferred 
solution is not exclusion of the statement but both the recorded conversation and the 
actual appearance of the child on the stand for cross-examination, despite the 
difficulties in such cross-examinations. Clearly, a mechanical recording of the 
statement is better for the jury determining the truth than the necessarily selective 
testimony of a likely biased human observer, and since the law may be heading toward 
entirely exempting these interviews in most situations from Confrontation Clause 
scrutiny, recording may be the only realistic protection remaining.  
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considered above where the statement is elicited by a publicly 
disclosed investigative agent with the purpose of establishing 
facts about past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.39 By contrast, coconspirator statements are 
apparently entirely exempt from scrutiny under the 
Confrontation Clause, whether made to true conspirators or to 
those who are government agents if their status as agents are 
unknown.40 Statements by children to non-law enforcement 
professionals who question the child with both investigative 
and non-law-enforcement interests in mind—what I term 
mixed purpose interviews—are in an uncertain category.41  
Moreover, Professor Berger’s approach of skepticism 
toward government generated hearsay and enabling the jury to 
make a better decision by the required creation and disclosure 
of mechanical recordings of the interviews remains sound even 
if not part of the testimonial statement approach of Sixth 
Amendment confrontation right. As the right matures through 
further rulings by the Court, perhaps a flexibility and nuance 
will be developed to supplement the right of confrontation, and 
ancillary protections of the type she suggests may be embraced. 
If not, the fundamental idea is no less sound. It simply 
must get its support from another source and find its command 
in legislation or a different constitutional right, such as due 
process. My recent interests have prompted me to examine the 
role of the innocence movement in motivating and shaping 
criminal procedure reforms.42 One area of overlap that relates 
  
 39 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
 40 In Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2691 n.6 (2008), the Court stated 
that coconspirators statements “would probably never be . . . testimonial” because they 
must be made “in furtherance of the conspiracy.” This statement suggests an exclusive 
focus on the purpose or intention of the declarant in making the statement and 
suggests no different treatment when it is a government agent who elicits the 
coconspirator’s statement. 
 41 See Mosteller, supra note 6, at 968-75 (recognizing the uneven treatment of 
statements, including videotaped statements, made for multiple purposes and the 
capacity of those formulating the process to give the questioning an apparently non-
investigate primary purpose); Robert P. Mosteller, Giles v. California: Avoiding Serious 
Damage to Crawford’s Limited Revolution, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675, 682 (2009) 
(noting an apparent or likely trend toward courts finding mixed purpose statements 
nontestimonial). 
 42 See Robert P. Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, Care 
About Innocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2010); Robert P. Mosteller, The Special 
Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who Are Not Innocents: Producing “First Drafts,” 
Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
519 (2009) [hereinafter Producing Informant’s “First Drafts”]; Robert P. Mosteller, 
Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The 
Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257 (2008); 
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to Professor Berger’s insight is the control of informants who 
have played a role in the conviction of a number of innocent 
individuals for crimes they did not commit. My particular focus 
is on the danger of false informant testimony to those who are 
innocent of the specific crime charged but who are not 
strangers to crime.43 
The evidence that I find critical and subject to remedy is 
the testimony of informants who change or refine their version 
of events after contact with the police. Like the hearsay that is 
of concern to Professor Berger under the Confrontation Clause, 
this testimony sometimes bears the imprint of governmental 
agents who “turn” a criminal suspect into a cooperating witness 
by eliciting statements that incriminate the ultimate target of 
the prosecution. One of my remedies is based on an argument 
that the constitutional right under the Due Process Clause to 
have exculpatory information, including impeaching 
information, should have practical protection. Like Professor 
Berger, I argue that the police-citizen encounter should be 
recorded.44 Because of their exposure to punishment and their 
strong desire to please the police and the prosecution, many of 
these informants are arguably vulnerable witnesses under her 
terminology.45 
There is no “magic bullet” to cure the dangers of 
informant testimony, particularly when defendants with past 
criminal involvement are concerned. Many of those defendants 
are clearly guilty and many of them are also threats to the 
insiders who might be able to offer incriminating testimony. 
Moreover, because of their general involvement in crime, 
investigative authorities will be receptive to the story the 
informants are offering, and informants will often have the raw 
material to fashion convincing false testimony from real or 
imagined past activities of the target or from the conduct of 
those who actually were responsible for the crime. Informants 
may be important to the justice system, but their testimony, 
which is sometimes false, is also dangerous to it. 
  
Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A 
Fundamental Failure to “Do Justice”, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337 (2007). 
 43 See Mosteller, Producing Informant’s “First Drafts”, supra note 42, at 522. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Professor Bennett Gershman explicitly categorizes cooperating witnesses 
as vulnerable to suggestive questions along with children and eyewitnesses. See 
Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 829, 844 
(2002).  
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Likely the only realistic protection for those who are 
innocent that is not too costly from a law enforcement 
perspective is to provide a more complete picture of the process 
to the jury. My proposal is, with Professor Berger, to require 
the recording of what I term the “first drafts” of informant 
testimony when such statements are produced after contact 
with criminal investigators.46  
If significantly inconsistent with the informant’s 
testimony, the production of those statements is already 
constitutionally required by the Brady doctrine.47 If consistent 
with the informant’s testimony, production should only benefit 
the government. Thus, there might seem little theoretical 
reason why the statements are not produced. However, 
practicality, adversarial incentives, and the fear that the 
process of “turning” the informant cannot withstand disclosure 
stand in the way. 
Critically, most early statements are not recorded, and 
the fact that they are inconsistent remains unknown or 
undisclosed to the defense. It is the defense that is motivated to 
carefully examine the process and point out the changes in the 
story. Those on the police and prosecution side in many 
marginal situations do not have the mindset to notice and 
disclose inconvenient facts, which may be assumed to be 
innocuous under the sincerely held view that the defendant is 
guilty. More recording and disclosure should have a rightful 
role. 
III. CONCLUSION: A CAREER CHARACTERIZED BY REASONED 
JUDGMENT 
I close by observing that Professor Berger’s ideas are not 
only creative, but also have impact because wrapped into them 
are the intensity of her serious consideration and her attention 
to her craft as a practitioner, critic, and life-long student of the 
  
 46 So as not to inhibit police-suspect conversations and to provide a 
recognizable “trigger point,” I would impose the requirement of recording at the point 
the issue of a benefit to the informant is broached. See Mosteller, Producing 
Informant’s “First Drafts,” supra note 42, at 568-69. 
 47 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (finding the failure of the 
prosecution to provide potentially exculpatory evidence to the defense to be a due 
process violation). In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Supreme Court 
characterized its ruling in United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), to be that 
“[i]mpeachment evidence . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady 
rule,” and rejected a distinction between exculpatory evidence and impeachment 
evidence. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676. 
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law. For that set of characteristics I can find no better term, 
nor higher praise, than reasoned judgment.48 It is present in all 
that Professor Berger has done.49 It is a characteristic that is at 
the heart of what I believe all of us who devoted our careers to 
the law aspire. 
In her long and exceptional career, Professor Margaret 
Berger has contributed so much to the law, and particularly to 
the development of the law of evidence, that any effort to mark 
her many contributions will be inadequate.50 I have tried to 
illustrate these contributions through her fundamental 
insights that we must rely on the imperfect institution of the 
jury to sort through our most difficult problems of proof, and 
for the jury to have a chance to do its task properly, it needs 
detailed and accurate information.  
When the government is involved in creating evidence, 
particularly hearsay, the dangers of abuse are substantial. 
Declarants should be required to testify and be subject to cross-
examination. In addition, one of our best and most realistic 
remedies for that abuse is to require that modern technology be 
employed to record in a verbatim fashion the transactions 
involved in that creation. By presenting that information, we 
  
 48 The writings of the constitutional scholar and my former colleague Jeff 
Powell inspire this accolade. In examining constitutional interpretation, he has coined 
the termed “constitutional virtues,” which consist of (good) faith, integrity, humility, 
and candor. H. Jefferson Powell, Constitutional Virtues, 9 GREEN BAG 379, 389 (2006). 
In his recent book, Constitutional Conscience, Jeff expands on these fundamental 
concepts. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL 
DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL Decision 100-01 (2008) (expanding the discussion and adding 
the virtue of acquiescence). A central example of what he believes should be the goal of 
everyone who attempts constitutional interpretation is the Attorney General in 
President Ulysses S. Grant’s administration who was asked to render an opinion on a 
constitutional issue, which Powell believes was rendered in full adherence to his craft 
as a lawyer and his public duties. See id. ch. 3. 
  In a similar vein, I mean the characterization of “reasoned judgment” as 
truly a high compliment. As one who cares deeply about the practice of law and the 
intellectual exploration of ideas, Professor Berger has both mastered and been true to 
her craft.  
 49 Even before I entered law teaching, I held Professor Berger in high regard, 
first encountering her work in the masterful treatise on the Federal Rules of Evidence 
that she co-authored with Judge Jack Weinstein. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET 
A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE (1975). I found that in almost all situations the 
treatise set forth with great precision, even in the early days of the operation of the 
rules, what the law was. Occasionally, it would deviate and state what the authors 
thought the law should be. These deviations were always creative, and they contained 
a remarkable measure of reasoned judgment. The courts may not have universally 
adopted their suggestions, but when they did not, it was most often a matter of judicial 
misjudgment.  
 50 For example, I have not even referred to her exceptional contribution to the 
analysis of the admission of scientific evidence and her service on multiple committees 
of the National Academy of Sciences. 
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better equip the jury to assess the value of the evidence and the 
value of the words of sometimes absent witnesses. Whether 
formally part of a confrontation right or recognized and 
guaranteed through other legal mechanisms, the insight is 
sound and manageable. It clearly shows the reasoned judgment 
of an insightful and committed legal scholar, who practiced her 
craft in ways that all in the field of evidence would hope to 
emulate. 
